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I. INTRODUCTION
 
This paper is a summary of SEADAG Project No. 70101, which supported
 
a series of case studies in Korea and the Philippines of the capacity
 
of the legal system to facilitate the urban development process in
 
developing countries. In this summary,
 
"urban development process"
 
means the process through which land acquisition and development projects
 
are initiated, planned, and completed as a part of the urban transformation
 
of a developing country. Land acquisition projects were emphasized
 
because all countries, in order to carry out public works and similar
 
programs, need to have some method of acquiring and developing land.
 
Urban development planning is illustrated by a study of the regional
 
planning process in the Philippines.
 
The term
 
"legal system"
 
includes not only the relevant substantive law but the necessary legal
 
institutions, such as the courts and administrativ. igencies. By
 
"capacity to facilitate"
 
is meant the ability of the legal system to achieve the objectives
 
contemplated by the use of legal power in the urban development
 
process. Two introductory papers by Prof. Mandelker (1) and Mr.
 
Magavern provide a conceptual framework for the studies that were
 
carried out in the project. Professor Mandelker's paper begins with
 
the assumption that a legal system which facilitates is also
 
interventionist. He states that the legal system
 
"seeks to intervene in and give new direction
 
to rArket forces in urban development which
 
are perceived as operating imperfectly,
 
producing recults which make neither an
 
efficient nor an optimal use of resources."
 
Several elements of the legal system determine the extent to which
 
that system can achieve this objective. These are:
 
1. Span of Control. The extent to which the legal system
 
provides effective control over the urban development process,
 
2. Public-Private Power Split,. The degree of division of power
 
between these two componentseof the system.
 
3. Constraints on Power. The legal constraints which are imposed
 
by the legal system on the powers exercised by the public sector.
 
4. Distribution of Power Among Units. The types of powers which
 
the legal system confers on the many agencies in the urban development
 
process.
 
Magavern (2) argues that while the fundamental problems of urban
 
development are similar in developing nations, the effectiveness of
 
programs directed to these problems depends as much upon extra-legal
 
conditions ths have arisen from a country's historical, economic and
 
cultural background as upon its political and legal system. Magavern
 
illustrates his argument by contrasting legal, political, cultural and
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economic conditions in the Philippines and Korea.
 
In the first part of his discussion Magavern describes the general
 
background of the legal system in both countries. Both provide for
 
a separation of powers among legislative, executive and judicial
 
branches, both recognize local government and a bill of rights. But
 
the way in which these general laws are implemented in planning programs
 
is different in both countries. In Korea, substantially unrestricted
 
planning powers are vested in administrative officials, and a minimum
 
of protection has been provided for owners of land. In the Philippines,
 
planning powers vested in the National Planning Commission, have been
 
limited by the doctrine that no legislative power can be delegated
 
to an administrative agency without sufficient standards and important
 
implementary regulations have been held unconstitutional.
 
In his discussion about local government in the two countries
 
Magavern states that in comparison with the Philippines the Korean
 
constitution provides a firmer foundation for local government (3)
 
even though both constitutions leave it to national legislation to
 
determine both the form and the content of local government. In practice,
 
local governments in both countries are dominated by the national
 
government. Yet there are significant differences in the relationship
 
between local and national governments in both countries. The autonomy
 
of Philippines local government has been strenghtened by the limitation
 
of'Presidential power to interfere in local affairs. Local government
 
here has also gained importance by bringing people into active
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participation and, consequently, has linked local to national politics.
 
But the effectiveness of this aemingly favorable situation has been
 
lessened by the fact that local government has often had to comply
 
with personal favors demanded by the national administration and, even
 
more important, by the absence of a strong party system iwhich could
 
diminish the importance of personal politics. Local government in
 
Korea, 2ves though it han been given a firmer constitutional foundation,
 
has not gained strength in autonomy and popular participation. Because
 
of its weakness there occurs less friction with the presidential power
 
which, when personal relationships between the president and the
 
representative of the local government are favorable, allows for
 
more effective planning. The negative side of this situation is that
 
local government does not provide a strong check against arbitrary
 
power as the stronger local government in the Philippines does.
 
Differences between both countries are greatest with respect to
 
the protection accorded to private property against government action.
 
Both constitutions leave it to the courts to elaborate specific
 
principles about property owner protection. But even though the Korean
 
constitution appears on its face to contain more explicit guarantees to
 
private owners, these guarantees have not been implemented in
 
practice. The vague and general clauses of the Philippine constitution
 
have, on the other hand, been elaborated in practice into specific
 
doctrines of property protection. Magavern's opinion is that the
 
Philippine courts might have been even too zealous in their protection
 
of private property in the past and not enough interested in the
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public welfare. This attitude has been changing.
 
In the land acquisition process, we find an even more striking
 
contrast between the laws of these countries. The Philippine courts
 
have at least been willing to undertake a definition of the proper
 
extent of the land acquisition power, but no such development has
 
occurred in Korea. Magavern explains the differences in the working
 
of tha legal system in the two countries in terms of similarities and
 
differences in critical extra-legal factors. Both countries are similar
 
in the importance given to education, in their family-centered cultural
 
systems de-emphasizing the importance of business relationships, and
 
in their older cultural traditions which emphasize conciliation over
 
adjudication. Both countries are formal unitary states. But in Korea
 
effective legal power is centrally concentrated with no local check,
 
a situation which is disadvantageous to the ordinary citizen. In
 
the Philippines there is greater dispersal of power, leading to a more
 
definite tendency to rely on the law in case of disputes.
 
Magavern next discusses the differences between both countries
 
taking into account their economic development, the position of the
 
land-owning class, and the historic and cultural background. For
 
example, property in the Philippines has long been in private hands,
 
and has been fragmented along American lines. Property ownership in
 
Korea has been more restricted. These differences may explain the
 
greater attention paid by Philippine courts to the rights of landowners.
 
At the same time, more rapid industrialization in Korea has not been
 
accompanied by a shift to Western legal styles. 
The non-Western
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Confucian legal tradition has remained dominant.
 
The balance of this Report will analyze some of the case studies
 
which were prepared for this project and which illustrate the issues
 
discussed by Professor Mandelker and Mr. Magavern. In this summary,
 
I will examine these case studies from two different perspectives.
 
First, I will consider the extent to which urban development projects
 
have been accommodated by the legal system. For example, one of the
 
projects in the study was the building of a new high school in a
 
Filipino municipality outside Manila. While even the building of a
 
project as straightfotvardas ahigh school placed stresses on the
 
Philippine legal rystem, the high school was a comparatively simple
 
enterprise which required only a minimum use of existing legal
 
institutions. In contrast, the Manila North Division Road, another
 
public works project, required the execution of a public enterprise
 
on a scale never before attempted in the Philippines, and eventually
 
led to a breakdown in the legal framework which was devised for the
 
program.
 
Second, I shall consider the impact on existing social, political
 
and economic institutions of different legal techniques. Some legal
 
techniques require direct public intervention. For example, in the
 
Kwangju new town project (4) in Korea the government played the major
 
role in the development of a satellite city. This project in turn had
 
a direct impact on settlement and economic development patterns in the
 
Seoul region. Sloboda's paper (5)suggests a different and indirect
 
method of intervention in the Korean housing market and is intended to
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achieve comparable results. 
Young's (6) study in the Philippines is
 
by contrast an analysis of political influence on the success and
 
failure of regional planning programs.
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II. THE EXTENT TO WHICH URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS HAVE BEEN ACCOMODATED
 
BY THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
A. San Juan High School Case Study (8)
 
San Juan del Monte is a municipality of Rizal, a province of Luzon,
 
and is enclosed on three sides by the Manila metropolitan area. The
 
local government is headed by a Mayor, elected for four years, who is
 
the local executive and also the presiding officer of the municipal
 
council. There is also a municipal secretary and attorney who,
 
respectively, assist and act as local counsel on administrative matters.
 
An unusual feature of the muntcipality is the San Juan Development
 
Council, which is a citizens planning and advisory council to the
 
municipal government. Although 40 per cent of the population in San
 
Juan is of school age, there was no public high school in the
 
municipality when Joseph Ejercito Estrado ran for the office of Mayor
 
in 1967. One of his main platforms was the establishment of a public
 
high school, and after his election he proceeded to implement this
 
promise. His most immediate problem was to find R site for the school
 
in a municipality which was suffering from a shortage of land for
 
development. Land acquisition is largely a matter of negotiation
 
in the Philippines. Although the doctrine of eminent domain exists (7)
 
it is a comparatively diminished power, and is exercisable only by
 
the provincial board upon the recommendation of the municipal council.
 
Therefore, the Mayor began the school project by suggesting the
 
use of land owned by the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
 
(NAWASA). NAWASA agreed, and a lease was negotiated. We should note
 
//
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that the Mayor had personal contacts on the NAWASA Board which were
 
helpful to him in securing this lease. Once the lease was signed the
 
San Juan Municipal Development Council approved the project, cost
 
estimates were obtained, and final authorisation by the munidipal
 
council was executed. However, squatters living on the site then
 
began to protest its use for school purposes, and secured a court
 
order halting construction of the school.
 
While a dispute between the squatters and the municipality over
 
the appropriate use of the NAWASA site led to this litigation, the
 
squatters did not attempt to restrain construction of the school
 
on this basis. Land titles are confused in the Philippines as in
 
many developing countries, and doubts about title to the NAWASA
 
land were utilized as a legal basis for stopping the school project.
 
Eventually, and in part through the use of political influence, the
 
Mayor and his allies persisted and the school was built. (8)
 
B. Manila North Division Road Case Study
 
Some projects examined in this Report revealed a situation in
 
which existing legal institutions performed inadequately. One such
 
project was the Manila North Division Road (MNDR) (9). This road,
 
unlike the San Juan High School, was a national priority project.
 
The study indicates that the highway wAs initiated because the two
 
main feeder highways to Manila from the provinces of Luzon were in­
adequate to meet tral~ice volumes, but at first the national government
 
had ro effective legal machinery to undertake this project. A joint.
 
road widening proposal of the Bureau of Public Works, the National
 
/
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Planning Commission and the Department of National Defense gave way
 
before a national act which required the creation of an integrated
 
highway system. A newly established Bureau of Public Highways (BPH)
 
was given the authority to plan the national hIghway system, which
 
included the Manila road system, but progress with road planning was
 
slow.
 
Two years after planning for the highway project began the issue
 
became political and the Congress prompted a feasibility study. This study
 
was published a year later and totally negatived any expansion of the
 
existing road. As a result of this report a solution to the problem
 
was sought elsewhere, and a suggestion was made that an expressway be
 
Lbiilt alongside the Manila RoiIroad Company strips parallel to one
 
of the existing highways. However, this approach was immediately
 
rejected, mainly on the Fround that there was no law governing the
 
development of an expressway in the country. 
The Limited Access
 
Highway 1957 was then enacted, and it provided the necessary legal
 
authority. Under this Act the Department of Public Works and
 
Communications was empowered to recommend acquisition of public property
 
and property rights for limited access highway facilities, and
 
"to plan, designate, establish, regulate, locate,
 
alter, improve, maintain and provide limited
 
access facilities whenever it is of the opinion
 
that traffic conditions, present or future would
 
justify such facilities." (10)
 
Two alternative expressway plans were considered next, and the
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MNDR plan was finally approved in 1960, seven years after the initial
 
decision to build a highway in this area.
 
However, even though legal machinery had been created for the
 
project this machinery did not function smoothly. The acquisition of
 
right-of-way especially proved to be a stumbling block, and property
 
owners were able to impose substantial delays by refusing to sell.
 
Only :hirteen landowners agreed to sell initially, and negotiations
 
continued for somo time. 
 The remaining landowners were then offered
 
a higher price, which they refused, but no decision was at first made
 
to proceed with compulsory acquisition. However, by this time strong
 
politicalpressure had built up favoring immediate acquisition of the
 
right-of-way, and to expedite matters expropriation actions were then
 
started, much to the surprise of the landowners. Moreover, in 1964
 
construction of the expressway was started on a section of land .which
 
had been acquired by negotiation. However, in 1965 the incumbent
 
President was defeated in an election and development came to a stop.
 
The tew President favored the expressway, however, and to advance the
 
project a court decision was sought and obtained which awarded the
 
government the right-of-way. Compensation was deferred and was to be
 
determined in proceedings before a newly created commissioner.
 
Immediately after that decision the construction of the highway
 
resumed. However, financial planning was found to be inadequate
 
and the project began to run out of money. The President was committed
 
to this expressway politically, however, and so he ordered completion of
 
one side of the highway and set about finding a method for obtaining
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funds to continue the construction of the other half. In view of the
 
apparent inability of the public sector to carry out this project,
 
steps were then taken to enable the highway to be completed by a
 
private company. A natiotial statute was utilized for this process.
 
This act enabled the government to contract with private companies
 
for the construction of a highway as well as other public facilities.
 
These private companies would then be permitted to charge a reasonable
 
toll for the use of the highway. The highway was then advertised
 
for bidding, but only one bid was made, by an amalgamation of a number
 
of large Philippine construction companies. Construction of the
 
highway began when agreement had been reached or price between these
 
companies and the government.
 
However, although the project was finally completed other problems
 
still remained. By mid-1967 only two compensation cases had been heard
 
by the relevant authority. The price offered for the land was, dnd is,
 
the cause of continuing litigation, for the matter has not yet been
 
settled but is being fought through the Philippine courts.
 
These two Philippine studies suggest a personal system of
 
administration in which conventional legal institutions cannot cope
 
fully with a major development project, such as a major highway. The
 
difficulty is confirmed by a study like the San Juan high school case
 
study, in which even the success of a comparatively routine project
 
for the construction of a high school required the personal political
 
commitment of the Mayor, and the willingness of a second major public
 
agency to make the necessary land available. Even then, protracted
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litigation was required to establish the municipality's right to use
 
the land it had leased for the high school building.
 
/ ' 
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III. THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT LEGAL TECHNIQUES ON SOCIAL,
 
POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
 
A. The Contribution of a Site Value Tax to the Korean Housing Problem
 
Rural migration to urban centers in Korea has created a housing
 
problem of major dimensions in Seoul and in other cities. 
 Seoul has
 
been unable to assimilate all of these low income families, and they have
 
built squatter dwellings on the city's outskirts.
 
The government has therefore felt it necessary to initiate a
 
series of measures to deal with this housing problem. Sloboda's
 
supplementary paper adopts the thesis that housing construction should
 
be stimulated through modification of building regulations or by
 
government assistance to the sub-market for building materials and
 
urban land. To date the Korean government had been attempting to
 
assist the urban land market through the Speculation Control Tax, land
 
use zoning, expanding the supply of urban land in metropolitan areas,
 
and the creation of a green belt around central districts. Sloboda
 
points out, however, that in Korea and most of the developing countries
 
the price of land and services still makes it impossible for a low
 
income family to own a home. He therefore suggests that land prices
 
be further lowered through application of a site value tax on the
 
value of land for development. In this manner the government would
 
provide indirect assistance to the solution of the housing problem.
 
Sloboda's paper elaborates the advantages and disadvantages of such
 
a tax in the Korean context.
 
/ 
15 
B. 	Kwangju New Town
 
An example of more direct legal intervention in the Korean housing
 
situation is provided by the construction of Kwangju new town, near
 
Seoul. 
 It must be pointed out that the Korean government was late
 
in recognising the need for comprehensive urban dcvelopment, and
 
the problem of regional planning was largely ignored. Sveda's article
 
(11) explains the regional planning background which contributed in
 
part to the decision to create Kwangju, which Mr. Walker and Professor
 
Kwon studied for this project. We will concentrate here on Walker's
 
report. (12)
 
Walker finds many reasons for the decision to create the new
 
town at Kwangju. Basically, they center around the increasing size
 
and urbanization of Seoul, with all its concomitant advantagen and
 
disadvantages. 
As I have pointed out, heavy immigration to Seoul
 
led 	to a housing shortage and the building of squatter settlements.
 
The 	development of squatter housing on the outskirts of the city was
 
detrimental to the development of Seoul and an attempt was made to
 
deal 	with this problem. Kwangju was one of the projects which
 
attempted to resettle the squatter families.
 
The 	chronology of the Kwangju project follows: 
 The Kwangju
 
site was approved in 1968 and Seoul City was authorized to purchase
 
the necessary land. By mid-1969 construction of t'te main road and
 
drainage system was under way and within three months 15,000 people
 
had been resettled in the area, each family having been given a small
 
plot of land. However, public services for these people were very
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nearly non-existent and their first winter in Kwangju was hard. In
 
addition to inadequate living conditions there were no employment
 
opportunities and many wage-earners had to make a two hour trip to
 
Seoul to work. By the end of the winter approximately a quarter of
 
the people had left, having first sold their assigned plot of land.
 
This sale of land was illegal, but there were growing numbers of
 
people who wanted to move into Kwangju voluntarily and they were
 
willing to buy. Furthermore, there was no legal technique which tied
 
the settlers to the land they had been allotted, and the government
 
also turned a blind eye to these resale transactions. This action
 
by the private sector was important, and owing to the absence of
 
interference from the government became an important key to the
 
development of Kwangju.
 
Tales of hardship continued to come from Kwangju and so the
 
government of Seoul acted in May, 1970, to improve the situation.
 
They began to construct public service facilities for the area and to
 
create industrial estates. The project was also helped by an agreement
 
between the governments of Seoul and Kyongji Province, in which Kwangju
 
is located, and which provides that money earned by Seoul in Kwangju
 
wfll be re-invested there. This agreement appears to have been kept.
 
Resettlement continued and the town had 150,000 inhabitants by mid-1971.
 
Riots then occurred in August, 1971, and were sparked by settlers
 
demanding jobs, and by second settlers (who had illegally bought plots
 
from first settlers) protesting the price they paid for their land.
 
After this riot the new city entered a more stable period.
 
/
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Walker's report discusses the conceptual basis for cre&ting
 
Kwangju, the implementation of the project, and the settlement pattern.
 
He first states that the concept of a satellite town is new to Korea,
 
and that there have been difficulties in implementation which were
 
not foreseen. For example, the industrial estates have been slow to
 
develop, and some industries have been attracted, not to Kwangju
 
itself, but to the green belt area north of the city which the government
 
has not protected from development, though it has the power to do so.
 
Walker fears that if the government carries out another of its plans
 
and moves industry to the green belt area near Seoul, much of the
 
conceptual basis for Kwangju and the green belt area 
will be
 
destroyed. 
Walker next notes that the most noticeable developmental
 
feature of the Kwangju project is the absence of open spaces and wide
 
roads. This, he says, is typically Korean and reflects land shortages.
 
The development is also typical of the usual Korean mix of residential,
 
conmercial and industrial development. Only the plan for industrial
 
estates is new to Korean concepts of urban development.
 
Walker then analyses the implementation of the project, and it
 
is here that he finds problems within the development process which
 
have made its implementation difficult. Administratively, the power
 
for developing Kwangju rests with the Seoul government. However, the
 
new town lies in Kyongji province, and friction developed between
 
the two governments which finally led to an agreement which clarified
 
their respcnsibilities. Under this agreement, coordination of develop­
ment in the project will be carried out by the Minister of Home
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Affairs, with an appeal to the Prime Minister. In addition, the agree­
ment noted above concerning the reinvestment of money earned in the
 
project was executed.
 
Land was also needed to carry out the project, and about ten
 
per cent of the land in the project area was publicly owned. The
 
purchase of the remaining private land caused difficulties, especially
 
over price. The city wanted to freeze the price of the land as of
 
the time the Kwangju project was announced, and initial purchases
 
were made on this basis. However, as soon as the landowners learned
 
that the city had no legal basis to hold prices down to this level
 
they refused to sell their land, as under the law they were to be
 
compensated for the value of the land at the time of taking. This
 
value was in turn determined by the land use classification adopted
 
by the province, over which Seoul had no control.
 
In view of these problems Seoul was willing to make concessions
 
to assist the development of the project. The city tried to solve
 
the compensation problem by offering landowners 20 per cent of the
 
original agricultural land in the new town within a year of sale and
 
in lieu of cash. This "exchange land" would allow the landowners
 
to be compensated by the increase in land prices in the new town, but
 
conveyance of the exchange land was delayed as it was not utatil mid­
1969 that construction of the new town got under way.
 
Once the city obtained all of the necessary land it allotted
 
plots to relocated squatters and voluntary settlers. Of the residential
 
land 40 per cent was utilized-for the relocation of squatters from
 
Ki
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Seoul. To allocate the land fairly a lottery was carried out among
 
the squatters. The rest of the residential land was held by the
 
original landowners as "exchange land". Commercial land was sold at
 
public auction to help finance the project. This land was called
 
"reserved land", and was primarily placed along the road, where
 
it could be a major revenue source for the project. Industrial land
 
was sold at a minimum price to encourage the location of industry
 
in the town. Public facility land is primarily used for schools,
 
roads and green belts.
 
The methods used to finance the project were unusual but typically
 
Korean, as the city government utilized profits from the sale of land
 
in the project to meet project expenses. It was able to do this
 
because it bought land in the project area before the project was
 
announced, and then sold off some of the land for commercial development
 
at the higher prices that obtained after the project got under way.
 
The behaviour of the people who moved into Kwangju forms the
 
next part of Walker's report. He looks at the interaction between
 
groups of people within the project insofar as this interaction
 
illustrates the dynamics of the development process. He points out
 
that three factors helped determine the settlement pattern:
 
I. The division of power between Seoul and the province;
 
2. Forced resettlement during project construction; and
 
3. The large number of people to be resettled and the timing
 
of resettlement.
 
The first of these policies he illustrated by pointing out that
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land allocation was carried out by the city but building permits were
 
issued by the provincial government, a division of authority which
 
often led to confusion. The early resettlement of people when services
 
were not present also led to difficulties. Another important factor
 
was the never-ending movement of people into the project, as fresh
 
waves of settlers kept land speculation going. Often squatters sold their
 
land at a high price and then bought cheaper land. With each new
 
lottery for residential land and with each private auction of reserved
 
land a new cycle of price increases began.
 
Walker divides the residents of Kwangju into those who chose
 
finally to move out of Kwangju and those who chose to remain.
 
Initially a large nu-,ber of people decided to leave Kwangju, mainly
 
because of a lack of jobs and facilities. However, as the population
 
of the project grew the proportion of the people who stayed began
 
to increase. Measures were then taken to create jobs so that the
 
satellite town could move toward self-sufficiency.
 
The area was by then inhabited by original settlers, second
 
owners, and renters. Walker found that approximately one-third of
 
the residents are renters, many original settlers having sold their
 
plots and stayed on in rented properties. Original settlers often
 
had to sell their plots because they were too poor to build on
 
them. Their tendency to sell was reinforced by a policy which
 
required a house to be built on a plot within a month of its acquisition
 
under the lottery. This policy was intended to keep land speculation
 
in check, but it often forced resettled squatters to sell their land
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so that they could buy cheaper land elsewhere in the project where
 
they could afford to build. A second policy required any person who
 
bought from an original settler to pay the government the increased
 
purchase price immediately. This second policy was an attempt to
 
keep the first settlers in the project, but it was not effective as
 
many "second owners" did not know of the immediate payment regulation.
 
In fact, their anger at this rule was a major factor in the August,
 
1971, riots.
 
Walker concludes that the forced resettlement program evolved
 
into a pattern in which people either sold their land and went back
 
to Seoul or stayed in Kwangju as landowners, renterG or squatters.
 
He indicates that the project has been successful to the extent
 
that it has attracted voluntary settlers from Seoul. However, difficulties
 
have developed in the project which were not anticipated, primarily
 
because of land speculation and the failure to provide needed services
 
and jobo in sufficient quantity. Whether Korea should be encouraged to
 
improve its governmentally-sponsored development programs, such as
 
Kwangju, or to facilitate the u.-ban development and settlement process
 
through more indirect methods, such as the site value system recommended
 
by Sloboda, is an open and important question.
 
C. Regional Development Planning
 
Young's paper (13) describes the regional planning process in the
 
Philippines. It begins with some working definitions, as Young points out the
 
,, / 
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different meanings of regional development and states that "development"
 
will be defined in accordance with the stated objectives of the regional
 
development agencies under review. He then states that the kind of
 
"region" under discussion in this report: will have defined character­
istics which are:
 
1. It is sub-national,
 
2. It is multi-jurisdictional,
 
3. It is designated as a development region by the national
 
government,
 
4. The purpose of the designation is to improve the economic and
 
social development of the residents of the area.
 
Young points out that a regional development agency is an organization
 
which is responsible for bringing about "development" within a specified
 
geographic area.
 
Young then states that the Philippines was selected as an
 
environment for a study of regional planning because it has a poly­
nucleated political system and has made several attempts at regional
 
development programming. Generally, it 
can be stated that the structure
 
of the Philippine government is similar to a single state in the United
 
States. 
It has a popularly elected President, a bicameral legislature,
 
and a local government system of provinces, cities, and municipalities
 
which are subject to the legislature. The system is decentralised,
 
and local influence is important, especially as national officials
 
require the help of local political leaders in national elections.
 
Young selected three agencies for his study, the Mindanao
 
Development Authority (HDA), the Bicol Development Planning Board (BDPB),
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and the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA). In this summary of
 
the Report I will discuss only one of his agencies.
 
This study was started in expectation of finding certain key
 
variables which could explain the success or failure of these original
 
agencies. It was assumed that the more direct the tie with the
 
national President the more successful the agency would be. However,
 
it became obvious early in the study that the opposite appeared to be
 
true, and it became apparent that one could not analyse these agencies
 
without considering the impact cn their success of the local-national
 
system of electoral bargaining. Young states that this impact is more
 
important to the success of an agency than the competence of its
 
personnel, intra-bureau conflict and competition, and structural
 
arrangements within the agency and within the government as a whole.
 
These latter factors have usually been accepted as having the most
 
impact on a planning agency's program.
 
To give a clear picture of Young's study ! will take one of the
 
agencies on which he bases his report and describe his treatment of
 
it and his conclusions. The Bicol Development Planning Board (BDPD)
 
was born at a seminar in 1964 and its members were all elected Bicol
 
provincial and city officials with their chiefs, assistants, national
 
agency directors, and various resource individuals. Initially it
 
attempted to stimulate regional officials to participate in development
 
planning and to provide training programs in the field. Official
 
recognition for the Board was given on July 27, 1965, by an Executive
 
Order which stated that the Board:
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"shall conduct scientific and systematic surveys
 
of the assets and potentialities of the Bicol
 
region, plan its development, and pool the
 
resources of the provinces and cities thereof
 
for the implementation of programs to enhance
 
the economic, social, industrial, and commercial
 
development and the general welfare of the region.
 
and its people."
 
Of the seven powers given to the board the most important were:
 
1. To act as the technical arm of the Bicol provincial and
 
city executives on matters concerning regional planning; and
 
2. To advise and assist local planning boards in the region.
 
The Board ultimately consisted of the governors of the six Bicol
 
region provinces and the Mayors of the three cities. Financing was
 
to come from the provinces and cities in an amount agreed initially
 
and eventually fixed at one and one-fourth per cent of the annual budget
 
of each participating government. Local planning development departments
 
were to gather data, prepare plans for the locality, and in addition
 
assist in preparing the regional plan in that district.
 
Young points out that trying to draw conclusions about this agency
 
is difficult because traditional criteria do not apply to an organization
 
whose goal is to plan rather than to undertake specific projects. He
 
cobcludes, after surveying its history, that the tangible accomplishments
 
of the BDPB over its first seven years are few. These include numerous
 
meetings stressing the need forplanning with many groups; many project
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plans but no comprehensive plan for the region; and improving road
 
and air transport into the region.
 
However, by mid-1971 the BDPB was no longer effective, and a
 
Government Reorganisation Panel even suggested abolishing the Board.
 
Even the Board was uncertain of its mission. Funds began to run out
 
in 1970 and 1971, and as the provinces and cities were not able to
 
support the Board it was red-iced in size by one-half. By mid-1971
 
the Board had drafted legislation transforming its funding from a
 
local to a national base. This change, it was maintained, would not
 
alter the policy of the Board.
 
Although the creation of a competitor, the Bicol Development
 
Corporation, was a factor in BDPB's failure, it was not the only
 
factor. Young advances other reasons,. such as an inability to obtain
 
support, even from its most active founders. But the failure is
 
basically explained by the influence of local and national politics.
 
Young points out that the national President has four powers over
 
regional agencies. He may:
 
1. Appoint boards;
 
2, Release funds;
 
3. Resolve bureaucratic conflicts; and
 
4. Veto legislation.
 
The second power is very important. Funds made available for agency
 
expenditure may not be utilized unless released by the President.
 
In his power over the release of funds the President has a heavy
 
control over BDPB, and has used it to undercut its financial support.
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Congressional influence is also exercised over regional agencies,
 
through its authority to establish and alter agency powers and
 
structures, appropriate funds, and investigate agency operations.
 
Congressional control is usually not as powerful as the President's.
 
Initially BDPB had no contact with the national legislature, but in
 
1971 it did cbtain Congressional appropriations.
 
National and local party politics also have an important influence
 
on a regional planning agency's program. The party system is led by
 
the President, and he uses the system to enhance his position. As he
 
is dependent on the party for his office, the party's interests dominate.
 
This party system of leadership is often detrimental to the local
 
regional agencies. When all is going well the agency thrives. When
 
political problems occur the agency has difficulty surviving. To
 
prevent total destruction of the regional agency lccal politicians have
 
to be sufficiently strong to withstand the party and to maintain the
 
agency's interest. Any conflict within an agency's region between
 
party leaders also has a detrimental effect on the agency, as local
 
political leaders may frequently shift parties to obtain greater
 
material rewards. These switches in affiliation can often hurt a regional
 
planning agency which ends up on che wrong side of a political dispute.
 
Other governmental agencies are also important. The regional
 
planning agency must maintain a good relationship with the national
 
bureaucracy. It is an important link to other agencies and to
 
government bureaus. Courts are important, as the party and President
 
can use them against the agency. However, owing to the time and expense
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factor, the Judicial process has not been used extensively. At all
 
stages of decision-making the private-sector also intervenes in the
 
agency program, and it maintains this access through the political
 
system.
 
it is evident from this discussion that it is politics and
 
patronage that sustains these agencies, and Young states that none of
 
the three agencies studied were free from national or local political
 
influence. He concludes that if the agencies are to survive and be
 
successful they must be protected from corrosive political power.
 
For example, dependency for funding on the President should be broken,
 
or at least minimized.
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IV. CONCLUSION
 
This summary has analysed some of the case studies that were
 
undertaken in this project from two perspcctives--their ease of execution
 
and the impact they had on social, political, and economic institutions
 
in the countries in which they were undertaken. I might now conclude with
 
some brief additional comments on the relationship between the legal
 
systems of these two countries and the impact on these systems of the
 
cultural setting in which they must be utilized. Magavern's model is
 
again helpful here, end it can be constructively applied to an analysis
 
of the contrasting Kwangju and San Juan projects.
 
The Kwangju project was carried out by a highly centralised
 
government which reacted to an urban crisis, a squatter city on the
 
edge of Seoul. Seoul, which is legally responsible solely to the
 
President, acquired land and ordered development, organised land lotteries,
 
and even before the new town was started moved thousands of people out
 
to the new settlement. The city ordered contractors and industry into
 
the area, and when failure threatened took what action they could to
 
revive the project.
 
Technically speaking, Kwangju is a masaive project for a legal
 
system to undertake and many inadequacies in the legal system became
 
apparent. For example, restrictions on building and on the sale of
 
land proved difficult to enforce. Only a highly centralised govern­
mental system allowed the government to"muddle through" with this
 
project. Ultimately, a riot was needed to bring change.
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On the other hand, the San Juan study illustrates the small-scale
 
conflict, often ending in litigation, which is typical of the
 
Philippines. The key to the success of the San Juan High School project
 
was the Mayor's personal commitment. In a system where, as we have
 
found, personal politics is the key to success, this type of commitment
 
carried the day, managing to overwhelm even the attempt by squatters
 
on the school site to prevent its use for another purpose.
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